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Supreme Court of Canada Equality 
Jurisprudence and “Everyday Life” 
Patricia Hughes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 30 years since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms1 and nearly 25 years since the first section 15 equality 
case, it is worth asking to what extent the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
equality jurisprudence is meaningful for the initiatives undertaken in 
“everyday life”. Does it pose a model for the kinds of equality efforts 
organizations undertake or does it pose too low — or complex — a 
standard to be helpful? Is it even possible to advance equality signifi-
cantly through the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence? From a 
slightly different but equally important vantage point, how valuable does 
the section 15 jurisprudence appear to be in non-section 15 cases raising 
equality issues? In either case, the question is the extent to which the 
section 15 jurisprudence informs or has the capacity to inform other 
equality contexts. Here I consider this issue in a preliminary way. 
While I cannot provide here an in-depth examination of the many 
ways in which substantive equality is gradually infusing Canadian life, 
nor the ways it is not doing so, in the next section, I do briefly examine a 
few equality initiatives undertaken in the legal, education government 
and corporate sectors of society.2 I am asking whether the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 Executive Director of the Law Commission of Ontario and formerly Dean of Law at the 
University of Calgary. The views expressed here are her own and should not be attributed to the Law 
Commission of Ontario. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 These initiatives are meant to be illustrations only of the various efforts these and other 
mainstream sectors have undertaken to advance the equality of those affected by or subject to them 
or to increase the diversity of their membership, for example. I have selected these sectors because 
they operate in one way or another within the same realm as the Supreme Court of Canada (the legal 
sector and government), have a significant impact on people’s lives (government) or while not 
immune from Charter decisions, may consider themselves somewhat distant (corporations). Further, 
I refer to them only briefly, taking them at face value, and make no effort to assess whether they do 
in fact satisfy the Charter or their own objectives. 
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Court’s equality jurisprudence has the capacity to guide initiatives or to 
serve as a “beacon” against which equality initiatives might be measured. 
Of course, specific judicial decisions may result in particular initia-
tives or changes in policy. Furthermore, to some extent the impact of the 
Charter is “in the air”. It has bolstered the “equality conversation” over 
the last three decades and Supreme Court rhetoric around equality has 
been part of this process, just as the Court’s decisions have ignited 
debate. However, my more specific conclusion is that Supreme Court 
decisions do not for the most part assist in prompting or designing 
societal equality initiatives because the decisions themselves do not 
accord with the Court’s rhetoric, and as a result offer a sometimes erratic 
path along which those wishing to advance equality must travel. Thus, 
while the decisions may have an impact in a particular case, this is not 
the same as the Court’s serving as a “leader” in the equality conversation 
that takes place in many sectors in society, nor does it mean that it has a 
significant impact in ensuring that equality initiatives occur in sectors 
slow to develop them. 
I suggest that the Court is one participant in a conversation that often 
(inevitably) transcends the Court’s contribution. Many people talk about 
equality and there are many different views about what it means, how to 
implement it and how to determine when it is achieved. The Supreme 
Court has few opportunities to express its views, has only a limited 
capacity to determine the cases that it adjudicates (being bound by the 
factual context and usually, at least, the parties’ arguments), and a natural 
and usually appropriate reluctance to stray far beyond the immediate 
dispute in its commentary, even in constitutional cases. However, this 
may be less significant than the fact that when the Court does have the 
opportunity (and seizes it — as I mention below, it often does not), the 
challenges posed by its jurisprudence mean that it has little to say to 
those attempting to implement equality “on the ground” or in everyday 
life. 
I provide a brief note on terminology before I elaborate further. A 
number of different terms are used to refer to “equality” in addition to 
“equality” or “substantive equality” itself, in particular “equity” and 
“diversity”. To be clear, when I refer to “equality”, I mean “substantive 
equality”, although this may not be the case with others to whom I refer. 
“Substantive equality” requires acknowledgment of and response to 
differences that members of a particular group might experience in order 
to be treated equally. It takes into account patterns of disadvantage that 
may require proactive responses to address. It is distinguished from 
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“formal equality”, which requires treating “likes alike” and “unlikes” 
differently to achieve equality, while substantive equality may require 
treating people differently in order to achieve equality. The creation of a 
“lens” to assess the impact of law and practice on particular groups is 
usually for the purpose of advancing substantive equality.3 
Sometimes “equity” is used synonymously with “equality”, often 
meaning “fairness”. “Diversity” may be used instead of “equality” to 
refer to the inclusion of previously excluded groups in particular initia-
tives. For example, the Canadian Bar Association’s (“CBA”) Equity and 
Diversity Guide uses the term “lawyers from diverse communities” and 
states, “This term captures the sum of all differences to consider when 
planning and implementing equity and diversity initiatives, for example: 
age, gender, race, physical ability, religious affiliation, faith, and creed”.4 
Both “equity” and diversity are employed to refer to an increase in 
numbers of persons from previously excluded groups within an organiza-
tion or to the incorporation of the cultural or religious practices of these 
groups. 
Underlying all these terms is the idea of “pluralism” as both a de-
scription of a society composed of different groups, religions and view-
points and a prescription about the importance of engaging them in the 
way society is structured and defined. Perhaps most important, the use of 
the term “pluralism” connotes a rejection of the assumption that only one 
viewpoint or experience is acceptable or legitimate, a necessary compo-
nent in the realization of substantive equality. 
Although in other contexts these terms may have different meanings 
and there may be important reasons that organizations I use as examples 
have chosen one or the other, for my purposes they are used inter-
changeably. 
                                                                                                             
3 For example, see Maritime Centre for Excellence for Women’s Health, Gender Equity 
Lens Resource Document (June 1999), online: <http://www.acewh.dal.ca/eng/reports/Gender%20
Equity%20Lens%20Resource%20Doc.pdf>. The Law Commission of Ontario has developed two 
frameworks of this kind, one relating to older adults and one to persons with disabilities, that discuss 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence as a minimum standard for achieving substantive equality, 
but not necessarily as the determinative standard: A Framework for the Law as it Affects Older 
Persons: Advancing Substantive Equality for Older Persons through Law, Policy and Practice (June 
2012) and A Framework for the Law as It Affects Persons with Disabilities: Advancing Substantive 
Equality for Persons with Disabilities through Law, Policy and Practice (July 2012), online: 
<http://www.lco-cdo.org> (forthcoming). 
4 Canadian Bar Association, The CBA Equity and Diversity Guide and Resource Manual 
for Successful Law Firms and Legal Organizations (August 2007), at 7 [hereinafter “CBA Equity and 
Diversity Guide”], online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/equity/pdf/equity_and_diversity_guide_eng.pdf>. 
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I begin by briefly describing in Part II some of the equality initiatives 
being undertaken by various sectors of society. In Part III, I explore 
major themes in the equality jurisprudence, including decisions that, in 
my view, have provided a signpost against which other initiatives need to 
be measured, and decisions that have provided blurred signposts or too 
many possible routes to be useful. I refer in Part IV to other vehicles of 
equality jurisprudence. 
II. RUMINATIONS ON ADVANCING SUBSTANTIVE  
EQUALITY IN SOCIETY 
By 1985, notions of equality embedded in anti-discrimination legis-
lation and jurisprudence were already somewhat advanced, sufficiently 
so as to be adapted to the Charter context.5 Other advances reflecting 
“equality” were also in play by then, such as pay equity6 and sexual 
harassment,7 to name two of many instances.8 Mention of these devel-
opments is merely meant to indicate that there were sophisticated 
discussions extant by the time the Charter was enacted, even though 
the achievement of the objectives reflected in these ideas has been 
uneven. Similarly, there is today an expectation about equality that is not 
explicitly tied to the Charter. There are many initiatives that have the 
                                                                                                             
5 As I indicate below, the Supreme Court’s first s. 15 case referred explicitly to anti-
discrimination postulates or premises in interpreting s. 15: Andrews v. Law Society of British 
Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. 
6 Quebec included a provision for pay equity when its Charter of Human Rights and Free-
doms was enacted in 1976: R.S.Q. c. C-12. In 1977, the Canadian Human Rights Act guaranteed 
equal pay for work of equal value (“pay equity”) for workplaces under federal jurisdiction: 
Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33. By 1985, Ontario had released its Green Paper on 
Pay Equity (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1985), building on developments 
that had been occurring for several years. My reference to pay equity or any other example is meant 
solely to indicate that concrete applications of equality were in play prior to the Court’s considera-
tion of equality. In some cases, subsequent developments have advanced equality further and in 
others, have curtailed it. In the case of pay equity in particular, the Supreme Court has contributed to 
a perception that it is expendable in the effort to achieve equality: Newfoundland (Treasury Board) 
v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees, [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 2004 
SCC 66, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NAPE”]. 
7 Constance Backhouse & Leah Cohen, Secret Oppression: Sexual Harassment of Working 
Women (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979). The Canadian Human Rights Code prohibited 
sexual harassment in 1984. 
8 Extensive discussions of equality can be found in the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Equality in Employment (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) and the 
accompanying Research Studies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985). The 
Report adopted a substantive equality definition of equality (at 3). Although the Report refers to the 
Charter, it is a prospective discussion since the Report preceded the coming into force of s. 15. 
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goal of increasing equality in one context or another (a few I refer to 
below). 
It is important to appreciate, though, that while the effect of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence may be ambiguous, the existence of the 
Charter and public conversations resulting from Charter cases run as a 
ripple throughout Canadian society. In some cases, specific Supreme 
Court decisions may serve as a catalyst to begin an initiative or to cement 
a development that was already in place. In fact, it would be unrealistic 
to think that a case before the Supreme Court (or any level of court) 
springs up without much that went before. Developments around the 
realization of gay rights provide an example. The Supreme Court’s 
recognition of “sexual orientation” as an analogous ground of protection 
under section 15, for example, was an important step in increasing the 
equality rights of gays and lesbians (and subsequently the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) community more widely), yet it was 
hardly either the first or the last word on the matter.9 Quebec had 
included “sexual orientation” as a protected ground under the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms in 1977, for example. It was not included 
as a protected ground under the Ontario Human Rights Code10 until 
1986, after previous attempts had failed, but nevertheless before the 
Court’s jurisprudence could have had an impact. The fight began before 
the Charter was enacted and the amendment occurred a decade before it 
was judicially added to the grounds under section 15 of the Charter.11 
While the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence forms part of the 
background against which equality initiatives are advanced, and while in 
certain areas the jurisprudence may prompt action, in reality these 
initiatives are part of a much larger dynamic. This dynamic flows from 
the increased participation of women in the political and economic 
spheres and increased diversity in cultural and religious practices, 
resulting in part from major changes in immigration patterns. Advances 
may result from pressure from previously excluded groups themselves, 
either internal or external to organizations, or from the efforts of “domi-
nant” group members who believe in equality or believe the organization 
                                                                                                             
9 Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) was the first case; 
however, the plaintiffs actually lost because a majority of judges upheld the relevant provisions 
under s. 1 of the Charter. 
10 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. 
11 The Court did have an impact in Alberta, however, where “sexual orientation” had not 
been included as a protected ground under the province’s Individual’s Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 
1980, c. I-2. In Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.) the Court held 
that the omission of “sexual orientation” was unconstitutional. 
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can otherwise benefit from incorporating diversity. Developments such 
as increased equality for women or accommodation of requirements 
arising from disabilities cannot necessarily be traced to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence (although in specific cases may be), but reflect some of the 
same stimuli that inform the Supreme Court’s rhetoric. The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence may be one factor that is part of the equality 
environment, but may not be specifically differentiated as having an 
impact.12 In some cases, it is clear that the impetus lay elsewhere.13 
There are many areas that would serve to illustrate the way in which 
equality has become part of the way we think about structuring programs 
or organizing society. For example, the Ontario Social Assistance Review 
Commission identifies growing “income inequality” as a factor justifying 
the review.14 If we think about what equality means in practice, words 
such as “participation” and “inclusiveness” come to mind and in this 
context, the short title of the new Ontario legislation governing supports 
for persons with developmental disabilities is the Social Inclusion Act.15 
These various developments have advanced along their own paths, 
successfully or not.16 I refer here to only a few of these developments, by 
way of illustration. 
Boyd points out that in law schools, for example, gender equality 
among students has been “achieved” in the sense that there are equal 
numbers of female and male students and even, in some cases, equal 
or nearly equal numbers of male and female faculty members.17 Propor-
                                                                                                             
12 One place where the Court’s jurisprudence is credited with influencing a decision can be 
found in the list of the CBA’s equality initiatives. The CBA’s Equality Committee was originally 
called the Standing Committee on Equality and then the Standing Committee on Equity. In 2011, the 
name was again changed back to the Equality Committee “to reflect developments in s. 15 Charter 
jurisprudence around the meaning of ‘equality’”: “Equality Initiatives” (June 2012), online: 
<http://www.cba.org/cba/epiigram/pdf/equality.pdf> [hereinafter “Equality Initiatives”]. 
13 The Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society Equity Office Monitoring Report for 2011 explains 
that the Equity Program was begun in 1994 in response to the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on the Donald Marshall Prosecution in 1990: Emma Halpern, “Equity Monitoring 
Report” (January 20, 2012), online: <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/2012-01-20_EquityMontoring
Report.pdf> [hereinafter “Halpern”]. 
14 Commission for the Review of Social Assistance in Ontario, Discussion Paper 2: Ap-
proaches for Reform (February 2012), at 47, online: <http://www.socialassistancereview.ca/uploads/
File/Discussion-Paper-2---Approaches-for-Reform-FINAL3.pdf>. 
15 Services and Supports to Promote the Social Inclusion of Persons with Developmental 
Disabilities Act, 2008, S.O. 2008, c. 14. 
16 A more thorough assessment of their impact requires a careful differentiation between 
rhetoric and application, in much the same way as one must assess the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence. 
17 Susan B. Boyd, “Spaces and Challenges: Feminism in Legal Academia” (2011) 44 
U.B.C. L. Rev. 205, at 205. 
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tionate numbers of racialized students and faculty members, however, do 
not yet exist at most law schools, although the numbers are increasing.18 
The curriculum in law schools, while much changed over the past 30 
years, is still a work in progress in exposing all law students to the law’s 
role in advancing or hindering substantive equality. As Boyd argues, it is 
important to have an ethic of feminism (or more broadly, I add, substan-
tive equality or diversity) throughout the structure and processes of law 
schools, and not only individuals who act often in isolation or who must 
grapple with an alien structure. 
Both the B.C. Branch of the CBA and the British Columbia Law So-
ciety have undertaken “equity” or “diversity” initiatives.19 The national 
CBA has listed a variety of equality initiatives covering women, the 
LGBT community and racialized groups20 and in 2007 issued a guide for 
advancing equity and diversity in law firms and legal organizations (that 
emphasized the benefits of diversity for business).21 The Nova Scotia’s 
Barristers’ Society Equity Office has a wide-ranging mandate in relation 
to the Barristers’ Society, the law and practice of law in Nova Scotia, 
access to legal services and education for lawyers in cultural compe-
tence, with a focus on “African Nova Scotian, Mi’kmaq and other 
racialized and linguistic communities, as well as other equity-seeking 
groups”, in particular women and the LGBT community.22 
As have other law societies across Canada, the Law Society of Upper 
Canada (“LSUC”) has created committees to address access to justice 
and issues relating to “equity” and Aboriginal persons and has under-
taken studies relating to diversity in the profession.23 One of the LSUC’s 
current programs is a “Career Coaching Program for Women in Sole and 
Small Practices”.24 Yet while a report on the composition of the legal 
profession in Ontario concludes, “[t]he legal profession in Ontario is 
changing dramatically”,25 one new report shows that only 25 per cent of 
partners at law firms in the Greater Toronto Area are women and only 2 
                                                                                                             
18 Id., at 217-18. 
19 Jennifer Chow, “The Call to Diversify the Legal Profession” (2011) 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 
25, at 43-46 [hereinafter “Chow”]. 
20 “Equality Initiatives”, supra, note 12. 
21 CBA Equity and Diversity Guide, supra, note 4. 
22 Halpern, supra, note 13. 
23 The Law Society of Upper Canada, Equity and Diversity, online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
with.aspx?id=2147484177>. See also Halpern, id. 
24 Law Society of Upper Canada, online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/index.aspx>. 
25 Michael Ornstein, Racialization and Gender of Lawyers in Ontario (Law Society of 
Upper Canada, April 2010), at i, online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convapril10_ornstein.pdf>. 
The picture is slightly more complicated, however, for Black lawyers: see id., at 5. 
252 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
per cent are “minority women”.26 The processes of law firms have 
changed somewhat, but the fundamental premises about what it takes “to 
get ahead” are much as they have been for decades and these practices 
militate against full participation by some members of the firm whose 
family commitments or religious beliefs may make it difficult to accord 
with the firm’s expectations. 
Some corporations are encouraging law firms to diversify by making 
it a condition of their retention by the corporation.27 Yet corporations 
themselves have not achieved a high level of diversity, although there are 
also initiatives by the federal government and private foundations to 
increase diversity on corporate boards.28 Dhir is particularly concerned 
about the gender and race composition of boards of directors, both of 
which, but particularly race, are under-represented.29 As does Boyd in the 
context of law schools, Dhir cautions that simply appointing people from 
under-represented communities to boards does not necessarily advance 
equality in a fuller sense, if they merely mimic existing members or are 
appointed merely to increase access to their communities. The increase in 
diversity to boards is a formal kind of equality, perhaps, but it does not 
necessarily help to realize a more deep-seated — substantive — equality. 
As for employees of corporations, research has found that diversity 
might be “better for business”. 
Diversity in the makeup of a group not only liberates members of the 
minority group to be more forthcoming about their views and to share 
information they may have that is unique, but it also induces members 
of the majority to state their views more explicitly and to re-examine 
their assumption. [This process] leads to more robust and well-
informed decisions.30 
                                                                                                             
26 DiversityLeads 2012 (Ryerson University’s Diversity Institute, 2012). 
27 Chow, supra, note 19. Also see A Call to Action Canada, online: <http://www.acallto
actioncanada.com/>. 
28 The federal government has created a new advisory council with the objective of increas-
ing the number of women on corporate boards: Janet McFarland, “Tories to promote women as 
directors”, The Globe and Mail (March 30, 2012) B5. Maytree, a private foundation that promotes 
equity, provides assistance in diversifying boards in both the private, public and non-profit sectors: 
Maytree, online: <http://maytree.com/about-us>. Also see Ratna Omidvar & John Tory, “Visible 
Minorities Shut Out of Leadership Positions” The Toronto Star (March 19, 2012), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/1148840--visible-minorities-shut-out-of-
leadership-positions>. 
29 Aaron A. Dhir, “Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: Canadian 
Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity” (2010) 35 Queen’s L.J. 569, at 572. 
30 Beth Bilson, “A Dividend of Diversity: The Impact of Diversity on Organizational 
Decision Making” (2011) 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 9, at 16. 
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Increasingly, the public education system is being developed to 
achieve “equity and inclusiveness”.31 There are also government initia-
tives intended to improve the lives of Aboriginal peoples, in areas such 
as education, economic status and violence against women.32 Public 
sector organizations are acknowledging the importance of “doing some-
thing” about diversity. The Ontario Public Service has been recognized 
as a “best diversity employer”.33 The Diversity and Inclusion Office of 
the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General has developed a “toolkit” 
for assessing law on the basis of diversity, for example.34 The City of 
Toronto employs an equity lens 
for Council and the Toronto Public Service to use when they prepare 
reports and review programs and services. This tool will guide staff and 
Council in removing human rights barriers as they plan, develop and 
evaluate policies, services and programs. The equity lens will be 
applied to all strategic policy and program reports.35 
Many of these initiatives are meant to put theory into practice. For 
example, the Nova Scotia racial equity/cultural proficiency framework 
is designed to assist persons in the education system to work effectively 
in cross-cultural situations.36 Efforts are also being made to measure 
government equality efforts, again without apparently using the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
31 See, for example, Ontario Ministry of Education, Realizing the Promise of Diversity: 
Ontario’s Equity and Inclusive Education Strategy (2009), online: <http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/
policyfunding/equity.pdf>. Also see Nova Scotia Department of Education, Racial Equity/Cultural 
Proficiency (Nova Scotia, 2011), online: <http://www.ednet.ns.ca/pdfdocs/racial_equity/RECPF_
WEB.pdf> [hereinafter “Racial Equity/Cultural Proficiency”]. This document is a framework 
intended to govern teachers and other education staff, school boards and curriculum in relation to 
cultural proficiency. See as well British Columbia Ministry of Education, Diversity in BC Schools: A 
Framework, rev. ed. (Ministry of Education, November 2008). This framework refers to the Charter, 
among other statutes, as sources for the school system’s obligations and values underlying the 
framework. 
32 See, e.g., Ontario Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Working Together to Improve Socio-
Economic Outcomes for Aboriginal Peoples Across Canada, online: <http://www.aboriginalaffairs.
gov.on.ca/english/news/2012/041112-aawg.asp>. Of course, there are many such efforts and while 
again, the rhetoric may be progressive, the success of the initiative remains to be determined. 
33 Globecareers, online: <http://www.eluta.ca/diversity-at-ontario-public-service>. 
34 A description developed in the context of a nomination for an award can be found online: 
<http://www.iccs-isac.org/en/councils/pssdc/sea/2011/team/Ontario%20team%20nomination%20-
%20OPS%20Diversity%20Office.pdf>. The lens is available only on the OPS intranet. 
35 City of Toronto, online: <http://www.toronto.ca/diversity/equity-lens.htm>. For more 
detail, see “Inclusion of an Equity Analysis using the Equity Lens in Reports to City Council” 
(September 14, 2009), online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2009/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-
23751.pdf> and City of Toronto, Office of Equity, Diversity and Human Rights, online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/diversity/index.htm>. The City publishes “progress reports” on its website: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/diversity/reports.htm>. 
36 Racial Equity/Cultural Proficiency, supra, note 31, at 1. 
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Court’s decisions as a reference point.37 A report by the Saskatchewan 
government on its own equality initiatives does not use abstract meas-
ures, but names specific concerns raised by women and shows what it 
has done to satisfy them.38 
The above are merely a smattering of the kinds of activities that 
represent efforts to include members of disadvantaged or previously 
excluded groups in previously heterogeneous bodies or to improve their 
situation more generally. There are many more, and there are also many 
assessments of various areas of life that show much needs to be done 
before we achieve substantive equality in all aspects of society. The 
question here is, what does the equality jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Canada say to or about societal equality initiatives?39 I suggest 
through an exploration of the jurisprudence that while in some instances 
the jurisprudence adds important legitimacy to certain ideas about 
equality, in other — and more frequent — cases, it does not provide the 
kind of clarity and moral authority from which societal initiatives can 
benefit. 
III. THE EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE 
1. Introduction 
The answer to my questions about the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
impact on equality initiatives in everyday life might be quickly and 
easily answered if we simply accept many academic commentators’ 
overall assessment of the jurisprudence. In the view of many commenta-
tors, the equality jurisprudence, despite the Court’s self-identified efforts 
to establish clear interpretations, has been muddled and inconsistent. For 
example, it has been described as “unsettled in important and troubling 
ways”;40 “confusing, unpredictable, overly burdensome and excessively 
formalistic”;41 and “bewildering, contradictory, fractured, and despair-
                                                                                                             
37 See, e.g., Melissa Martin, “Province gets passing grade” Winnipeg Free Press (March 9, 2012) 
1, online: <http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/province-gets-passing-grades-142031633.html>. 
38 Government Initiatives Responding to Women’s Issues (Saskatchewan Status of Women 
Office, 2003), online: <http://socialservices.gov.sk.ca/responding-to-womens-issues.pdf>. 
39 Of course, some of these initiatives might be challenged under s. 15 of the Charter, but I 
am speaking more generally here. 
40 Bruce Ryder & Taufiq Hashmani, “Managing Charter Equality Rights: The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Disposition of Leave to Appeal Applications in Section 15 Cases, 1989-2010” in 
J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R.(2d) 505, at 515 [hereinafter “Ryder & Hashmani”]. 
41 Id., at 517. 
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inducing”.42 Put simply, it lacks the coherence to offer serious guidance 
about how to realize substantive equality “on the ground”. I do not intend 
as a general matter to disassociate myself from these assessments, but I 
do want to identify where in my view the Court has made some impor-
tant elements of equality clear and where it has not. 
Section 15 is, of course, the main source of equality rights in the 
Charter, but it is not the only one. I first focus on section 15 and then I 
briefly identify in Part IV, with a very few examples, how equality may 
be advanced by non-section 15 cases. Fully understanding the impact of 
the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence requires some appreciation 
of how equality plays out in non-Charter cases or using tools other than 
section 15. I note here that while I generally refer to “equality” in a 
general sense, I recognize the need to consider sex equality, race equality, 
equality on the basis of disability and other forms of equality, as well as 
their intersection. I note also that “substantive equality” may be said to 
require “diversity” or “multiculturalism”, that is, it is not only a concept 
that applies to particular groups and their status in society, but also one 
that applies to the structure of society itself and how it is defined. When 
we consider the diverse grounds on which equality claims can be made, 
it becomes obvious that there are many other sites where equality can 
develop, a task beyond this paper. 
2. Section 15 
I limit my consideration to the section 15(1) test, including the mean-
ing of equality, the treatment of grounds and analogous grounds, the 
comparator issue and the approach to section 15(2). 
(a) The Rollercoaster of the Section 15(1) Test 
Andrews developed the basic parameters of the section 15(1) guaran-
tee in 1989.43 Andrews established that section 15’s guarantee was a 
guarantee of non-discrimination, not a general guarantee of equality, 
drawing on the existing anti-discrimination case law developed under 
human rights legislation:44 that section 15 advanced substantive and not 
                                                                                                             
42 Hester Lessard, Book Review of Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: Relational 
Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall L.J. 159. 
43 Andrews, supra, note 5. 
44 In later cases, notably British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commis-
sion) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 
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merely formal equality; that equality sometimes requires different 
treatment; that the infringement did not need to be direct or intended, but 
could be adverse or indirect; and that the list of protected grounds was 
not exhaustive, and that “analogous” grounds could be judicially added. 
Andrews also developed the test for determining whether there had been 
an infringement of section 15 that continues to apply: (1) has the law 
made a distinction between the applicant and others? has the different 
treatment been on the basis of a protected ground? and (2) has the 
different treatment had a negative impact on the applicant? Justice 
McIntyre called this approach the “enumerated or analogous grounds” 
approach. 
The early commitment to use “substantive equality” as the objective 
of equality jurisprudence was a crucial decision. Its rhetorical force has 
played a part in shaping our societal understanding of what equality 
means, although as Andrews itself recognized, the concept had developed 
well before the Supreme Court’s use of it. Even so, it was important to 
the understanding of equality in Canada that the Supreme Court un-
equivocably stated its commitment to that understanding at the earliest 
opportunity. And cases in which this conceptual framing took a more 
concrete form are equally important. For example, Eaton v. Brant County 
Board of Education45 involved the question of whether Emily Eaton, a 
12-year-old child living with several types of disability, should be 
integrated into a regular classroom with the help of a special assistant or 
should learn in a “special education class”. Justice Sopinka, speaking for 
the Court on this point, recognized a core element of substantive equality 
when he emphasized that it is not the “disability” that results in discrimi-
nation, but the failure of mainstream society to modify its practices in a 
way that will include persons with disabilities: 
Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construction 
of a society based solely on “mainstream” attributes to which disabled 
persons will never be able to gain access. Whether it is the 
impossibility of success at a written test for a blind person, or the need 
for ramp access to a library, the discrimination does not lie in the 
attribution of untrue characteristics to the disabled individual. The blind 
                                                                                                             
3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), the Court imported Charter jurisprudence into anti-discrimination law, erasing 
the distinction between direct and adverse-effect discrimination and integrating reasonable 
accommodation into the bona fide occupational requirement defence. Justice McLachlin (as she then 
was) for the Court said at para. 47: “In the Charter context, the distinction between direct and 
adverse effect discrimination may have some analytical significance but, because the principal 
concern is the effect of the impugned law, it has little legal importance” (emphasis in original). 
45 [1997] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.). 
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person cannot see and the person in a wheelchair needs a ramp. Rather, 
it is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune society 
so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and 
banishment of disabled persons from participation, which results in 
discrimination against them. The discrimination inquiry which uses 
“the attribution of stereotypical characteristics” reasoning as commonly 
understood is simply inappropriate here. It may be seen rather as a case 
of reverse stereotyping which, by not allowing for the condition of a 
disabled individual, ignores his or her disability and forces the 
individual to sink or swim within the mainstream environment. It is 
recognition of the actual characteristics, and reasonable accommodation 
of these characteristics which is the central purpose of s. 15(1) in 
relation to disability.46 
While one can certainly argue about whether any particular case 
results in substantive equality or whether the analysis used is consistent 
with achieving substantive equality (that is, how well the rhetoric 
matches outcomes), it is nevertheless a constant in the Supreme Court’s 
discourse and it gives legitimacy to it as an appropriate objective for 
societal change. 
It may be argued, however, that the Court’s emphasis on substantive 
equality is limited by the wording of section 15, since the reference to 
discrimination implies the need for a comparator, that is, a group that 
represents the way the applicant ought to be treated. The Court has read 
section 15 this way as being consistent with the reference to discrimina-
tion in section 15. Thus in the section 15 jurisprudence substantive 
equality is not an independent, freestanding standard; rather, its content 
in any given case is determined by how others — others who are more 
advantaged — are treated, even if this is not explicit.47 
                                                                                                             
46 Id., at para. 67. 
47 It has been argued that it is not the requirement of comparison that is the problem, but 
how comparison was carried out. See, e.g., Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: 
The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111 
[hereinafter “Gilbert & Majury”]. The Court itself accepted these criticisms in Withler v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Withler”]. In “Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups” (2006) 5 J.L. & Equality 
81, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau argues that discrimination does not necessarily involve a comparison 
and that to require a comparator can miss “certain very real forms of discrimination”. Nevertheless, 
this is the approach the Court has taken and this has limited the value of its equality jurisprudence. 
Outside the context of s. 15, substantive equality can be measured differently, as it is in some of the 
initiatives described above. It is possible to identify the initiatives that need to be undertaken for a 
particular group to experience equality as the standard to be met and to then compare the situation of 
the group with those standards without reference to the treatment of another group. 
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The Court’s treatment of the test applied under section 15(1) has also 
undermined this fundamental commitment to substantive equality. The 
Court has never abandoned the Andrews test, but it has detoured around 
it. Most notably, in Miron v. Trudel48 and Egan v. Canada,49 four judges 
introduced a “relevancy” component into the section 15 analysis: in order 
for the distinction to be discriminatory, the personal characteristics must 
be irrelevant to the purpose of the law at issue. For example, although 
acknowledging that “marital status” might be an analogous ground, in 
Miron v. Trudel, Gonthier J., for the four-member dissent, held that 
“[m]arriage is an institution entered into by choice which carries with it 
certain benefits and burdens”, including “the obligation of mutual support”. 
Thus, “where the legislature draws a distinction premised on a characteris-
tic relevant to the institution of marriage, such as these support obligations 
[which were inherent to marriage and not to common law relationships], 
then the distinction is not discriminatory and is therefore permissible”.50 In 
Egan v. Canada, La Forest J., speaking for the four judges, explained that 
marriage (between a man and a woman) was “the social unit that uniquely 
has the capacity to procreate children and generally cares for their 
upbringing”, and therefore it is appropriate that Parliament respond 
accordingly by not giving same-sex couples the same benefits.51 
In Miron v. Trudel, Gonthier J. refers to the “contextual examination” 
under section 15 under which “the distinction being drawn may simply 
reflect certain biological or physical realities or fundamental values 
which are in themselves relevant”.52 He explicitly rejected the notion that 
this approach imported into section 15 considerations more appropriately 
considered under section 1.53 Justice McLachlin (as she then was), for the 
majority, explained why she disagreed: “To require the claimant to prove 
that the unequal treatment suffered is irrational or unreasonable or founded 
on irrelevant considerations would be to require the claimant to lead 
evidence on state goals, and often to put proof of discrimination beyond 
the reach of the ordinary person.”54 Furthermore, while a distinction 
                                                                                                             
48 [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.) (whether denial of insurance benefits 
to a common law opposite-sex couple was discriminatory). 
49 Supra, note 9. The case deals with whether denial of old age spousal allowance to a 
same-sex partner because it was available only to a legally married spouse was discriminatory. 
50 Miron v. Trudel, supra, note 48, at para. 2. 
51 Egan v. Canada, supra note 9, at 537 (emphasis in original). 
52 Miron v. Trudel, supra, note 48, at para. 25. 
53 Id., at paras. 31-32. 
54 Id., at para. 129. 
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made on the basis of a protected ground may be non-discriminatory 
because it 
... does not have the effect of imposing a real disadvantage in the social 
and political context of the claim, ... Cases where a distinction made on 
an enumerated or analogous ground does not amount to discrimination, 
however, are rare. Faced with a denial of equal benefit based on an 
enumerated or analogous ground, one would be hard pressed to show 
that the distinction is not discriminatory. ...55 
After the detours of Miron v. Trudel and Egan v. Canada, the Court 
attempted to bring a coherent interpretation to section 15 in the unani-
mous decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion),56 reflecting the approach L’Heureux-Dubé J. had proposed in the 
former cases, and bringing the concept of “dignity” to the forefront.57 
Law appeared to be a significant step forward in signalling the end of the 
relevancy test and a common view of how to assess section 15 chal-
lenges. It, in turn, became the subject of growing criticism because of 
how its emphasis on dignity was applied.58 It was also not long before 
the Court divided again in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)59 and 
Lavoie v. Canada.60 The Court decided the next three cases unanimously: 
a successful section 15(1) case in which a man challenged provisions 
under the Vital Statistics Act61 disallowing him from having a say in the 
registration of his child’s name (Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney 
                                                                                                             
55 Id., at para. 132 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
56 [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
57 In passing, Iacobucci J. for the Court also indicated that intersectionality could be ad-
dressed through s. 15: id., at paras. 93-94. 
58 For example, although Greschner approved of Law as advancing “the cause of equality”, 
she argued that the Court could have waited to overcome its internal dissent and that it should 
reconsider “essential human dignity” as central to s. 15: Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the 
Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299. See also Craig D. Bavis, “Vriend v. Alberta, Law v. 
Canada, Ontario v. M. and H.: The Latest Steps on the Winding Path to Substantive Equality” 
(1999) 37 Alta. L. Rev. 683; and Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the 
Charter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 627, at 629, who “echo[ed] those who argue that Law’s cohesion 
was illusory and its test unworkable”. 
59 [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”]. 
Five judges held that there was no contravention of s. 15(1); seven judges held that there was no 
contravention of s. 7; four judges held that there was a contravention of s. 15(1) that was not 
justified; and two judges found a contravention of s. 7 that was not justified. (That is to say, two 
judges found an unjustified contravention of s. 15, but no contravention of s. 7.) 
60 [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, 2002 SCC 23, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (S.C.C.). Four judges found that 
a citizenship requirement for certain positions in the federal civil service contravened s. 15(1) but 
was justified under s. 1; three judges held that the requirement contravened s. 15(1) and was not 
justified; two other judges each held separately that there was no contravention under s. 15(1). 
61 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479. 
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General)),62 and two unsuccessful cases, one based on sex equality 
(NAPE)63 and the other on the basis of disability (Auton (Guardian ad 
litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General)).64 
These and other cases made it difficult to understand how the section 
15 test was to be applied, exactly what was to be addressed under section 
15 and under section 1, and the kinds of evidence necessary to justify an 
infringement under section 1. Although in its most recent cases, the 
Supreme Court of Canada appears to want to relegate much of the 
section 15 jurisprudence to the historical development of section 15 
rather than as part of the current thinking, and go back to the future with 
Andrews, in practice it is not clear that it has travelled far from the 
“relevancy” test so decisively rejected by the majority in Miron v. Trudel 
and Egan v. Canada. First in 2008 in R. v. Kapp,65 and then in 2011 in 
Withler,66 the Chief Justice and Abella J., speaking for the Court, sought 
to streamline the inquiry and to diminish the impact of dignity, the use of 
which had been heavily criticized. In those cases, the Court placed 
greater emphasis on concepts of prejudice and stereotyping than on the 
“simple” term “discrimination”, ostensibly diminishing the importance of 
selecting the “correct” comparator (I return to these cases below after 
identifying a number of other developments in the section 15 jurispru-
dence). Nevertheless, the factors relevant to determining a section 15(1) 
violation continue to conflate the section 15(1) and section 1 inquiries. 
In Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada,67 the Court con-
sidered whether the Crown had acted appropriately in the way it invested 
the royalties from oil and gas reserves found under the surface of two 
reserves which had been surrendered to the Crown. The Crown argued 
that the Indian Act68 prevented its investing the funds as the bands 
wished. The Court dismissed the bands’ section 15(1) claim on the basis 
that the provisions under the Indian Act do not perpetuate stereotyping or 
prejudice against the bands, that is, they are not discriminatory.69 In 
exploring the “the larger social, political and legal context” beyond the 
                                                                                                             
62 [2003] S.C.J. No. 32, 2003 SCC 34, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Under s. 1, the Court 
held that the impugned provisions were not minimally impairing and it is probably not insignificant 
that the legislature had already amended the statute to make it more responsive to particular 
concerns. 
63 Supra, note 6. 
64 [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, 2004 SCC 78, [2004] S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Auton”]. 
65 [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. 
66 Supra, note 47. 
67 [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, 2009 SCC 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ermineskin”]. 
68 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
69 Ermineskin, supra, note 67. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE AND “EVERYDAY LIFE” 261 
impugned legislation,70 Rothstein J. considered the financial benefits of 
diversified portfolios and other opportunities for investment, with brief 
mention without analysis of the impact on self-determination by the 
bands.71 There is no analysis of the treatment of and presumptions about 
“Indians” as reflected in the Indian Act and other historical develop-
ments. The reluctance to treat the broader contextual inquiry more 
seriously reduces the opportunity for the Court to develop a comprehen-
sive jurisprudence under section 15(1) that adequately assesses the 
stereotyping and prejudice that has been reflected in Canada’s treatment 
of Aboriginal peoples. Equally significantly, the entire analysis occurs 
under section 15(1), and as that claim fails, there is no move to section 1 
and therefore no shifting of the burden to government. 
The appellants in Withler were widows72 who received reduced fed-
eral supplementary death benefits because of their husbands’ ages at the 
time of death (the husbands were members of the plan). The benefit, 
provided in a lump sum, is reduced by 10 per cent for each year by which 
the plan member at the time of death exceeded age 65 or 60, depending 
on the particular plan. Their claim was unsuccessful. Chief Justice 
McLachlin and Abella J., for the Court, considered “the purpose of the 
impugned provision in the context of the broader pension scheme”,73 
including the “allocation of resources and legislative policy goals”.74 The 
claimants did not appear to require the benefit and the cost of the benefits 
would have been extensive. The decision included assumptions made 
about survivors’ needs based on the age when the plan member died. 
While some of the factors considered may well be appropriate to con-
sider in determining whether discrimination is justified, they are again all 
considered under section 15(1), where the onus lies with the claimants. 
Furthermore, the section 15(1) analysis is based on generalizations, with 
the only reference to the claimants’ own situations being a brief reference 
to the lack of evidence that they needed the supplement (even though the 
plans are not needs based). 
                                                                                                             
70 Id., at para. 193, quoting R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 
1331 (S.C.C.). 
71 Id., at paras. 196-199. 
72 They were representative plaintiffs in two class actions. 
73 Withler, supra note 47, at para. 71. 
74 Id. 
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(b) Treatment of the Grounds 
The Supreme Court has dealt with several issues arising from the 
listing of grounds under section 15, including the addition of other 
grounds, the degree of scrutiny afforded different grounds and whether a 
complainant can make a claim on a combination of grounds. 
Although there is no basis in section 15 to subject complaints based 
on some grounds to less scrutiny than others, “age”, while an enumerated 
ground, and despite the Court’s protests to the contrary, tends to be given 
shorter shrift than the other grounds, as evident in Gosselin and Withler.75 
In Gosselin, McLachlin C.J.C. relies on her general impression to find 
that young people are not discriminated against, even though she cites 
references showing that they had higher rates of unemployment; how-
ever, the program at issue was designed to respond to that situation and 
therefore ameliorate it.76 Withler continues to treat age as the basis on 
which distinctions are obviously and necessarily made, without putting 
the government’s feet to the fire to show that in the particular case, the 
age distinction is necessary, that is, that it is not merely a proxy for 
administrative efficiency or other similar reasons.77 This is not to say that 
age is not meaningful to our capacity to engage in a wide range of 
activities or to be independent, for example, especially when one considers 
the extreme ends of the age continuum. The message from the Court, 
however, is that “age” automatically matters, and that it does not require 
the kind of serious inquiry about its use as other grounds should attract, 
and sometimes do. 
                                                                                                             
75 Gosselin, supra, note 59; Withler, supra, note 47. 
76 Gosselin, id., at para. 44. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé stated at para. 112 (citations omitted, 
emphasis in original): 
At the s. 15 stage, courts should not be concerned with whether the legislature was well-
intentioned. This Court has long recognized that an intention to discriminate is not a 
necessary condition for a finding of discrimination ... By necessary implication, the fact 
that a legislature intends to assist the group or individual adversely affected by the im-
pugned distinction also does not preclude a court from finding discrimination. Nor is it 
determinative, where a distinction produces prejudicial effects, that a legislature intends 
to provide an incentive for the affected individuals to alter their conduct or to change 
themselves in ways that the legislature believes would ultimately be beneficial for them. 
She also pointed out at para. 136 that the reference to ameliorative programs is meant to refer to 
programs designed to help those more disadvantaged, not the claimant. 
77 A defence under s. 1 that the use of age contributes to administrative efficiency might 
well succeed, but at least it would be clear that it is the government’s responsibility to provide the 
evidence on a balance of probabilities that this is actually the case and that a different approach 
might not be required to meet the minimal impairment test. The use of age as a proxy and the 
presumptions associated with age are considered in depth in the Law Commission of Ontario’s Final 
Report on Advancing Substantive Equality for Older Persons, supra, note 3. 
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In Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), the 
Court took the opportunity clarify the status of analogous grounds: 
The enumerated grounds function as legislative markers of suspect 
grounds associated with stereotypical, discriminatory decision making. 
They are a legal expression of a general characteristic, not a contextual, 
fact-based conclusion about whether discrimination exists in a particular 
case. As such, the enumerated grounds must be distinguished from a 
finding that discrimination exists in a particular case. ... 
The same applies to the grounds recognized by the courts as “analogous” 
to the grounds enumerated in s. 15. To say that a ground of distinction 
is an analogous ground is merely to identify a type of decision making 
that is suspect because it often leads to discrimination and denial of 
substantive equality ... Just as we do not speak of enumerated grounds 
existing in one circumstance and not another, we should not speak of 
analogous grounds existing in one circumstance and not another. The 
enumerated and analogous grounds stand as constant markers of suspect 
decision making or potential discrimination. What varies is whether 
they amount to discrimination in the particular circumstances of the 
case.78 
Although the Court has added a number of analogous grounds, it has 
steadfastly refused to add grounds representing economic status. For 
example, an attempt to add “workers and dependents” under Newfound-
land’s Workers’ Compensation Act, 198379 was dismissed without an 
explanation about why these groups were not analogous to the enumer-
ated grounds.80 In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), although 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. engaged in a full analysis to explain why “agricultural 
workers” was an analogous ground, the other members of the Court 
dismissed it more or less out of hand.81 One might infer that the Court does 
not believe that economic status has much to do with substantive equality. 
Although Law recognized that intersecting grounds (or a “conflu-
ence” of grounds) might constitute an analogous ground,82 little has come 
                                                                                                             
78 [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, paras. 7 and 8 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Corbiere”]. 
79 S.N. 1983, c. 48. 
80 Reference re Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.), ss. 32 & 34, [1989] S.C.J. No. 35, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 922 (S.C.C.). 
81 [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dun-
more”]. In Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.), the 
Court rejected the claimants’ assertion that they, school employees, constituted an analogous ground. 
School employees, unlike municipal employees, were prevented from running as school board 
trustees. 
82 Law, supra, note 56, at paras. 93-94. 
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of it. An exception occurred in Corbiere, where the Court recognized 
“Aboriginality residence” as an analogous ground because, in the words 
of the majority, “the distinction goes to a personal characteristic essential 
to a band member’s personal identity, which is no less constructively 
immutable than religion or citizenship. Off-reserve Aboriginal band 
members can change their status to on-reserve band members only at 
great cost, if at all”.83 “Residence” itself does not constitute an analogous 
ground because decisions “average” Canadians need to make are not as 
“profound” as decisions about whether to live on or off a reserve are. 
Furthermore, “[e]mbedded” analogous grounds may be necessary to permit 
meaningful consideration of intra-group discrimination.”84 Although the 
Court has not pursued this line of thinking, it nevertheless does hold 
potential for understanding claims that members of a particular group 
might bring in relation to the practices of their “own” groups, assuming 
that these cases fall under the Charter (although for a limitation on this, 
see the discussion of section 15(2) below). 
(c) Comparators 
I refer only briefly to the issues of comparators here, merely to reit-
erate the view that the Court has to date accepted that the need for a 
comparator group appears to be inherent in the reference to “discrimina-
tion” in section 15(1). The problem has been that finding the comparator 
the Court accepts or otherwise considers appropriate has been the bane of 
section 15 claimants, as academic commentators and the Court itself 
have said.85 In Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Devel-
opment), speaking for the Court, Binnie J. said, “a misidentification of 
the proper comparator group at the outset can doom the outcome of the 
whole s. 15(1) analysis. In fact, the seemingly straightforward selection 
of a comparator group has proven to be the Achilles’ heel in a variety of 
recent cases” and “the correctness of the ‘comparator group’ contended 
for by a claimant has thus been an important battleground in much of the 
s. 15(1) jurisprudence”.86 
                                                                                                             
83 Corbiere, supra, note 78, at para. 14.  
84 Id., at para. 15. Another “embedded ground” is pregnancy. 
85 See, e.g., Gilbert & Majury, supra, note 47. 
86 [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, 2004 SCC 65, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). Justice 
Binnie specifically referred to Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 29, 2000 SCC 28, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (S.C.C.); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 36, 2000 SCC 37, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lovelace”]; Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 
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Law explained that “a variety of factors” are relevant to determining 
the appropriate comparator, including the subject matter, purpose and 
effect of the legislation, as well as “[t]he biological, historical, and 
sociological similarities or dissimilarities”.87 Generally, the claimant will 
select the comparator; however, the court may refine it or determine that 
a different comparator is more appropriate. However, “a court cannot, ex 
proprio motu, evaluate a ground of discrimination not pleaded by the 
parties and in relation to which no evidence has been adduced”.88 In 
Auton, the Court did reject the claimant’s choice of comparator and its 
own selection, “a non-disabled person or a person suffering a disability 
other than a mental disability (here autism) seeking or receiving funding 
for a non-core therapy important for his or her present and future health, 
which is emergent and only recently becoming recognized as medically 
required”,89 one hopes is the nadir of unpredictable and cumbersome 
comparators. Not surprisingly, despite Law’s caution, there was no 
evidence about how the government had responded to requests for other 
new therapies and therefore no evidence about how the claimants had 
been disadvantaged. 
In Kapp and Withler, the Court said that it was taking a different 
view of the comparator requirements, reducing the focus on “‘mirror’ 
comparator groups” for a variety of reasons, all advanced by commenta-
tors and earlier decisions critical of the concept. Ironically, however, in 
Withler itself, the Court’s disagreement with Rowles J.A.’s dissent in the 
Court of Appeal is that in using the mirror comparator approach, the 
dissent “de-emphasized the operation of the Reduction Provisions on the 
death benefit in the context of the entire plan and lifetime needs of 
beneficiaries” and therefore failed “to fully appreciate that the package of 
benefits, viewed as a whole and over time, does not impose or perpetuate 
discrimination”.90 In other words, it is not the mirror comparator ap-
proach that brings the claimants’ challenge to a halt at the section 15(1) 
stage at the Supreme Court, but not using the mirror comparator approach. 
                                                                                                             
(S.C.C.), as well as M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) and Gosselin, supra, 
note 59, in which the issue “sparked a good deal of judicial debate”. 
87 Law, supra, note 56, at para. 57. 
88 Id., at para. 58. 
89 Auton, supra, note 64, at para. 55. 
90 Withler, supra, note 47, at para. 81. 
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(d) Section 15(2): Substantive Equality for Whom? 
The first attempt by the Supreme Court to provide any guidance 
about section 15(2) was Lovelace.91 It held that “the normal reading of 
s. 15(1) includes the kind of special program under review in this 
appeal”92 and the first step of an equality claim should be section 15(1) 
to “ensure that the program is subject to the full scrutiny of the discrimi-
nation analysis, as well as the possibility of a s. 1 review”.93 
In Kapp, the Court effectively turned Lovelace on its head and de-
cided that a finding that the impugned program is an ameliorative 
program under section 15(2) is normally the end of the inquiry with no 
need to “ensure that the program is subject to the full scrutiny of the 
discrimination analysis” or, indeed, any scrutiny under section 15(1).94 
Kapp made no mention of section 1, but it is difficult to understand how 
section 1 has any real meaning once a program has been “justified” as a 
section 15(2) program with likely no analysis under section 15(1). 
Kapp’s section 15(2) analysis gives some long-awaited robustness to that 
section; however, it leaves important questions unanswered and, while 
intended to advance substantive equality, risks adding to the weakness 
of section 15(1) for those who are most disadvantaged.95 It weakens 
the promise in Corbiere of the value of “embedded” analogous grounds 
(or even embedded enumerated grounds, one assumes).96 And it tells 
governments that they can respond to minority group needs by address-
ing the issues of the most “advantaged” (and possibly even “connected”) 
members without concern for those even more disadvantaged. 
Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunning-
ham provided an opportunity to apply Kapp.97 Alberta and the Métis 
negotiated the Metis Settlements Act (“MSA”) to establish lands for the 
Métis, recognize self-government and provide for protections for Métis 
culture. The claimants had registered as Indians under the Indian Act in 
order to obtain medical benefits. However, the MSA provided that 
voluntary registration under the Indian Act means that an individual 
                                                                                                             
91 Supra, note 86. 
92 Id., at para. 105 (emphasis in original). 
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95 I discuss this further in P. Hughes, “Resiling from Reconciling? Musing on R. v. Kapp” 
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96 Corbiere, supra, note 78. 
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cannot be a member of a Métis settlement. The claimants argued that this 
was discriminatory under section 15(1). The Court held that the MSA 
was an ameliorative program under section 15(2) and that it was consis-
tent with the objective of the program to exclude Métis who were also 
Indians. In writing for the Court, the Chief Justice concluded that “this 
does not mean that every program must recognize everyone who holds 
some claim to a group targeted by an ameliorative program”. In the 
particular case, “[i]n order to preserve the unique Métis culture and 
identity and to assure effective self-governance through a dedicated 
Métis land base, some line drawing will be required.”98 The Chief Justice’s 
reasoning does appear to soften the contours of the Kapp section 15(2) 
analysis, in part by blurring the distinction in approach between it and 
Lovelace.99 
While ostensibly minimizing the impact of the mirror comparator 
group, the recent jurisprudence shows that whether the comparator is a 
“mirror” of the claimant’s group or whether it is broader, comparator is 
still a serious problem in section 15 analyses: now claimants will be 
unsure whether they need to compare themselves to a specific group that 
receives benefits they do not or that does not bear a burden they bear, or 
to a potential “universe” of comparators. 
(e) Conclusion 
The significance of the Supreme Court’s constant commitment to the 
notion of “substantive equality”, even if not always reflected in the cases 
themselves, cannot be gainsaid. At the same time, however, despite the 
Court’s seemingly continual efforts to refine how to determine whether 
there has been a breach of substantive equality, we have been left with 
confusion and ambivalence about the role of the comparator, the ten-
dency to treat some grounds with less rigorous scrutiny than others and 
the almost complete insulation of programs designed to ameliorate the 
lives of disadvantaged persons from review to ensure that they do not 
worsen the lives of others. As I conclude below, these aspects of the 
section 15 analysis make it arduous to transfer generalizations from the 
jurisprudence to equality initiatives in society at large, discussed above, 
and equality analysis in other areas of law, discussed next. 
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IV. EQUALITY BY ANOTHER NAME 
Before the coming into force of section 15, the Court refused to find 
an equality right under guarantees other than section 15.100 In general, 
however, while there has been some debate over the issue, the Court has 
recognized that similar interests might be protected under different rights 
and that the rights are interrelated. For example, in Baier v. Alberta, 
Rothstein J. stated that “Charter rights overlap and cannot be pigeon-
holed. The interrelationship between the Charter’s various rights and 
freedoms is a long-standing principle that informs Charter analysis.” Nor 
does the fact that one section protects a particular right or interest mean 
another guarantee might also do so.101 However, when the Court is faced 
with a claim that includes section 15 and other grounds, it will often find 
that the other grounds are able to dispose of the case without saying 
much about section 15.102 On the other hand, section 15 has played a 
role under section 1 in cases in which the main issue was brought and 
considered under a different guarantee.103 
Although this paper does not permit an extended consideration of 
how other sections of the Charter might be vehicles for advancing 
substantive equality in different contexts, briefly canvassing the possi-
bilities illustrates that neither equality nor approaches to it need be found 
exclusively within the boundaries of section 15. Section 25 in relation to 
Aboriginal rights and section 23 in regard to the language of education 
                                                                                                             
100 For example, see R. v. Cornell, [1988] S.C.J. No. 24, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 461 (S.C.C.), in which 
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guarantee of freedom of association; and Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.), in which the claim was addressed 
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103 See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), in which 
Keegstra’s Charter challenges were under s. 2(b), freedom of expression, and s. 11(d), the right to a 
fair trial; however, the infringement of students’ equality rights was part of the reason the 
contravention of freedom of expression was held to be justified. 
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can be said to affirm or extend equality rights for Aboriginal persons and 
French and English minority linguistic populations, respectively. It has 
been argued that section 2(a) jurisprudence on freedom of religion might 
provide a better approach for equality analysis than that which has 
developed under section 15.104 
In a different way, equality may be an issue in freedom of religion 
cases. A controversial variation of the relationship between freedom of 
religion claims and equality is found in Bruker v. Marcovitz,105 which is 
about “intra-religion equality”, since both parties held the same religious 
views. Bruker and Marcovitz were divorced and as part of the agreement 
governing their divorce, Marcovitz agreed to obtain a get, a Jewish 
divorce. He failed to do so, and because Bruker also believed the get was 
necessary to her remarrying in the Jewish faith and to her having chil-
dren, she was not in a position to have the benefits that her civil divorce 
provided. Marcovitz argued that to require him to obtain the get or to pay 
damages for failing to do so infringed his freedom of religion. Apart 
from questioning whether the husband was actually motivated by his 
religious belief, Abella J. for the majority treated his failure to obtain it 
as a breach of contract and stated: 
[The resulting limitations on Bruker’s personal life] represented an 
unjustified and severe impairment of her ability to live her life in 
accordance with this country’s values and her Jewish beliefs. Any 
infringement of Mr. Marcovitz’s freedom of religion is inconsequential 
compared to the disproportionate disadvantaging effect on Ms. Bruker’s 
ability to live her life fully as a Jewish woman in Canada.106 
Section 27 of the Charter may be another source to underpin equality 
arguments. It provides that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural 
heritage of Canadians”. It has led to some concerns that its application as 
an interpretive provision could affect gender equality negatively. One 
commentator argues to the contrary, maintaining that section 27 should 
                                                                                                             
104 Carissima Mathen, “What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence Reveals About Equality” 
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be seen as advancing gender equality, not threatening it.107 It would allow 
the recognition of “the cultural and gendered (or other) aspects of many 
women’s identities”, that is to say, how their various affiliations interre-
late.108 Section 27, usually treated as an interpretive section, is also more 
directly relevant to equality; for example, it supports (although it does 
not itself guarantee) acknowledging the “equality” of different religious 
days of rest.109 
Finally, in some cases, equality is advanced in non-Charter cases and 
without any reference to the Charter. For example, R. v. I. (D.A.) in-
volved section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act,110 which provided for 
certain conditions to be met in relation to the testimonial competence of 
persons of 14 years of age or older (adults) with mental disabilities, as 
they applied to a 23-year-old woman with the mental age of a three- to 
six-year-old child.111 The majority emphasized the importance of a 
concrete assessment of whether a witness could communicate the evidence; 
it held that the trial judge was in error to rely only on whether the witness 
could distinguish between a truth and a lie in the abstract.112 Many lower 
court cases also illustrate how diversity issues can arise in personal 
injury, family, defamation and liberal, property, nervous shock, employ-
ment and immigration cases.113 
As long as there is no useful guidance from the Supreme Court on 
the nature of “substantive equality”, however, there is the risk that the 
search for it in the lower courts in non-Charter cases, as well as in 
Charter cases, will be more ad hoc than helpful and that the treatment of 
equality in other Charter guarantees will lack a consistent framework. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In considering how the Supreme Court of Canada views equality, it 
is crucial to see how it addresses it throughout its jurisprudence, although 
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the section 15 cases are the core and should govern or at least play a role 
in how equality claims are addressed when made through provisions 
other than section 15 or in non-constitutional cases. The additional issues 
raised by those cases or provisions would enrich the thinking about 
section 15 and, in the latter cases, would provide an opportunity to see 
how section 15 jurisprudence plays out in concrete situations other than 
constitutional equality contexts. This does not often occur, however. It 
is as if section 15 jurisprudence and other equality-related cases exist 
in isolation from each other, treading their own distinct and rarely 
intersecting paths. 
Similarly, a meaningful jurisprudence would have significance for 
how substantive equality is advanced in society generally. Those seeking 
guidance from the Court, however, will learn that while substantive 
equality is the goal, getting there places a significant onus on claimants; 
that selecting the appropriate comparator may still be more important 
than a broader understanding of what substantive equality means; and 
that governments can relatively safely advance the interests of “less 
disadvantaged” members of minorities without serious concern paid to 
the more disadvantaged members among them. Many societal initiatives 
simply do not involve an analysis of how to achieve their goals (or if 
they do, they rarely feel the need to refer to the discourse from the 
Supreme Court, whether actually ascribed to the Court or not), but seem 
to operate on an organic or elemental notion of (substantive) equality, 
stated as a given. And it is these initiatives that have the potential to 
change how our society operates. 
There are many societal arenas in which equality is cited as a goal, 
although the practice may seem less than stellar. The Court’s jurispru-
dence does not provide an adequate model by which these efforts to meet 
the goal of substantive rather than formal equality can be designed and 
assessed. The Court’s approach to economic issues under section 15 
downplays by implication the importance of initiatives directed at 
economic equality. Similarly, the jurisprudence has little to offer as 
guidance to efforts to make equality concrete, to implement objectives in 
practice. It may be that it cannot. The Court’s task is to decide specific 
cases dealing with sometimes narrow albeit serious contraventions of 
section 15 of the Charter. I would argue, however, that through doing so 
it should also provide the higher-level reference against which concrete 
measures can be assessed. Yet the Court’s decisions fail to have this 
impact, in part because too often the broader direction the Court is taking 
is unclear and is subject to detours, and in part because its own decisions 
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fall short of the more soaring rhetoric that is so often found in the Court’s 
decisions. Thus state and civil society efforts to increase substantive 
equality must and will continue for the most part without the degree of 
leadership the Supreme Court of Canada’s equality jurisprudence could 
and should provide. 
Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that the Court’s objective is not 
to provide this leadership, and equally a mistake to assume that all 
societal initiatives need to reference the Court’s jurisprudence. There will 
always be (to put it simply for this purpose) distinctive legal and societal 
paths along which substantive equality should advance. Ideally, they 
should enrich each other. To the extent these initiatives are government 
initiatives (in education, for example), they may from time to time be 
challenged under section 15 of the Charter; others may be reviewed in 
ways invoking equality (under human rights legislation, perhaps). Should 
the Court have the opportunity to review these cases, they might consider 
how these societal initiatives provide concrete examples that explore the 
implementation of substantive equality. More likely, other equality cases 
will allow the Court to review its section 15 jurisprudence (or other 
jurisprudence related to equality) and to apply it to new contexts. To 
diminish confusion is not to fix the jurisprudence at a particular time, but 
to acknowledge that the jurisprudence will need to evolve and to appre-
ciate that weaving threads into a coherent fabric, recognizing the impor-
tance of nuance and avoiding abrupt turns, will take us further over time. 
Only a jurisprudence that accepts the complexity of substantive equality 
will have something to say to the kinds of equality initiatives on the 
ground that must incorporate different needs and experiences, the way in 
which identities intersect and the reality of other societal demands. 
